F

ive years ago, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, unveiled her Green New Deal to set the European Union on the path toward energy neutrality, positioning it as a global pioneer and leader. Just a few months later, the Covid-19 pandemic struck, unleashing an economic crisis unparalleled in recent history. As if that were not enough, Europe faced the resurgence of war on its doorstep, accompanied by an ensuing energy crisis. We asked Alberto Alemanno, a professor of European Law at HEC Paris, to analyze the trajectory of the European Green Deal. Amid global crises, political pressures and shifting balances of power, the initiative appears to have lost prominence, raising questions about its future impact and Europe’s ability to lead the green transition.

Alemanno adopts an optimistic view. “I believe much remains,” he explains regarding the European plan for the transition, “because the Green New Deal was nonetheless the flagship legislative program of von der Leyen’s first mandate. During this period, the Commission outlined a macro-objective—climate neutrality by 2050—as the guiding star for two other goals: zero pollution and ecological resilience.  We are talking about 160 legislative acts proposed and largely adopted, integrated into various existing European policies that remain in force today: from energy to industry, foreign trade, transport, agriculture, and environmental policy. All of this is now a given. The brilliance of the Green Deal framework lies precisely in how it integrates these three objectives—climate neutrality, zero pollution and ecological resilience—into the dynamics of the internal market and existing policies. This framework was established in December 2019. Then, in 2021, with the Fit for 55 package, we saw an effort to further rationalize these objectives—particularly regarding emissions reduction—across various policies. The empirical question now is the extent to which the adopted legislative acts, which will need to be implemented going forward (a central goal for von der Leyen’s second Commission), will bring about a paradigm shift in European policies or merely result in marginal adjustments without real impact.”

 

A new political will

The Green Deal is no longer perceived as it was initially intended. It is often viewed with skepticism, even by those who once championed it. Ursula von der Leyen herself, along with the European People’s Party (EPP) that backs her, has almost distanced themselves from it during the campaign for the European elections in June.

“Between the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024,” Alemanno explains, “a political shift occurred, primarily driven by external circumstances beyond Brussels.

There is “a tension between the significant legislative legacy of the outgoing Commission and a new political will that leans toward slowing down the enforcement and implementation of these acts,” Alemanno

On one side were the farmers’ protests, sparked by concerns about the potential extension of environmental obligations to agriculture, even though such measures had yet to be implemented. On the other side was the call for a pause in adopting certain measures, advocated by liberal leaders such as Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo and French President Emmanuel Macron. Additionally, pressures from the EPP—whose support was pivotal for von der Leyen’s appointment as Commission President—prompted her to distance herself from certain policies. This led the new Commission not only to slow the pace of future legislative proposals on environmental matters but also, in an unprecedented move, to revisit previously approved files, such as those on combustion engines, dilute regulations like the anti-deforestation law and delay the implementation of several legislative acts.”

Thus, there is “a tension between the significant legislative legacy of the outgoing Commission and a new political will that leans toward slowing down the enforcement and implementation of these acts,” Alemanno observes. “The question,” he adds, “is to what extent there will be political will on the part of the Member States and the Commission itself to implement this grand project. We are talking about over a hundred interlinked and complementary legislative acts, often pursuing different objectives. At times, they reinforce each other, while at others, they conflict. So, regardless of the political will—or lack thereof—implementing these acts will be inherently challenging. Drafting and adopting them during the first legislature was much easier.”

 

 

 

 

The next challenges

In short, the progress made over the past five years has been the easier part of the task. The responsibility for completing it now lies, in particular, with Teresa Ribera of Spain, who has been entrusted with the role of Executive Vice President in the new Commission, overseeing a fair, clean and competitive transition. “Her portfolio is somewhat tense,” comments Alemanno. “On the one hand, she must consider how to use competition law to create a level playing field within the internal market, while simultaneously employing it as an industrial strategy to fund green technologies.”

O

ne of the first crises Europe will have to confront is in the automotive sector. President von der Leyen has announced that she will personally address this issue through a strategic dialog involving manufacturers and unions. According to Alemanno, one of the major vulnerabilities lies in the fact that the energy transition depends on technologies—such as batteries for electric vehicles—for which the European Union lacks its own raw materials. “The EU must fight to retain the resources it has,” he says, “but in this new geopolitical landscape, it cannot assert itself alone. Unlike other sectors, it cannot rely on the circular economy, as the circular economy does not provide a direct solution here as it might in other production cycles. This creates a real deadlock.”

 

Manufacturers, as well as a significant portion of politicians, accuse European legislators of favoring one technology at the expense of others.  “I see no reason not to experiment with alternative solutions, even if they are neither definitive nor entirely effective, as they are nonetheless useful as transitional measures. Ignoring these opportunities is, in a sense, self-sabotage,” the professor emphasizes. What is certain is that the current composition of the European Parliament offers the Commission less room for maneuver.

“This scenario, which I identified as a risk last June, is now becoming a reality,” Alemanno observes

“This is the first European Parliament in history without a clearly defined majority. It is also the first time since 1979 that we are witnessing a European Commission that, on the one hand, can rely on the traditional centrist majority of center-right and center-left, but on the other, has a potential alternative right-wing majority. The latter, more skeptical of costly short-term measures deemed essential according current scientific perspectives and the scientific method, could significantly hinder progress on the Green Deal and, more broadly, on climate, environmental and biodiversity policies.” 

This duality in parliamentary majority poses a tangible challenge: the Commission could face a kind of oppositional majority whenever progressive legislative packages are brought before Parliament. There have already been several instances of this phenomenon: on at least four or five occasions, the EPP has voted in unison with the three parliamentary groups to its right. “This scenario, which I identified as a risk last June, is now becoming a reality,” Alemanno observes. “Although far-right forces are not aligned on fundamental issues such as NATO or the war in Ukraine, they demonstrate strong cultural cohesion in opposing any form of progressive policy promoted by the Commission.”

 

The trump factor

Another key external factor influencing Brussels has a familiar name: Donald Trump. “In two years, the United States will face midterm elections, which could lead to very different outcomes from the current ones. However, I do not think Trump will be able to dismantle everything within two years,” Alemanno says. “He has already confirmed the Inflation Reduction Act introduced by the Biden administration, which was not particularly favorable to Europe, as it excluded the possibility for parts of the European industry to benefit from it. I do not foresee a true rupture. My argument, as early as November 5, was that there is much more convergence than divergence between the incoming and outgoing United States administrations on issues like deregulation, migration and climate. I do not anticipate a disruptive impact from this administration. Instead, I expect further support for the countertrend aimed at slowing down climate ambitions and the decarbonization process. These topics will be used as rhetorical points, but Trump will not rewrite the rules of the game, regardless of his decision to remain in or withdraw from the Paris Agreement”.